Searle, J. (1992). The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. [buy book]

Card catalog description
In this major new work, John Searle launches a formidable attack
on current orthodoxies in the philosophy of mind. More than
anything else, he argues, it is the neglect of consciousness that
results in so much barrenness and sterility in psychology, the
philosophy of mind, and cognitive science: there can be no study of
mind that leaves out consciousness. What is going on in the brain is
neurophysiological processes and consciousness and nothing
more--no rule following, no mental information processing or mental
models, no language of thought, and no universal grammar. Mental
events are themselves features of the brain, in the same way that
liquidity is a feature of water. Beginning with a spirited discussion of
what's wrong with the philosophy of mind, Searle characterizes and
refutes the philosophical tradition of materialism. But he does not
embrace dualism. All these "isms" are mistaken, he insists. Once you
start counting types of phenomena, you are on the wrong track,
whether you stop at one or two. In four chapters that constitute the
heart of his argument, Searle elaborates a theory of consciousness
and its relation to our overall scientific world view and to
unconscious mental phenomena. He concludes with a criticism of
cognitive science and proposes an approach to the study of mind
that emphasizes the centrality of consciousness. In his
characteristically direct style, punctuated with persuasive examples,
Searle identifies the vary terminology of the field as a main source of
trouble. He observes that it is a mistake to suppose that the
ontology of the mental is objective and that the methodology of a
science of the mind must concern itself only with objectively
observable behavior; that it is also a mistake to suppose that we
know of the existence of mental phenomena in others only by
observing their behavior; that behavior or causal relations to
behavior are not essential to the existence of mental phenomena;
and that it is inconsistent with what we know about the universe and
our place in it to suppose that everything is knowable by us. --This
text refers to the hardcover edition of this title.

Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Ch. 1. What's Wrong with the Philosophy of Mind
Ch. 2. The Recent History of Materialism: The Same Mistake Over
and Over
Appendix: Is There a Problem about Folk Psychology?
Ch. 3. Breaking the Hold: Silicon Brains, Conscious Robots, and
Other Minds
Ch. 4. Consciousness and Its Place in Nature
Ch. 5. Reductionism and the Irreducibility of Consciousness
Ch. 6. The Structure of Consciousness: An Introduction
Ch. 7. The Unconscious and Its Relation to Consciousness
Ch. 8. Consciousness, Intentionality, and the Background
Ch. 9. The Critique of Cognitive Reason
Ch. 10. The Proper Study
Notes
Bibliography
Subject Index
Name Index


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