Conclusion

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In the beginning

Philosophy of Mind (PoM), in its present form, is young

- Present form: highly informed by sciences of the mind
- Those sciences are young, especially neuroscience
- Neuroscience is ‘data rich and theory poor’

20th C. has been tumultuous for PoM, probably because of its changing face

Lyon’s analyzes this change using three dichotomies:

- internalism/externalism
- monism/dualism
- reductionism/anti-reductionism
Internalism/externalism & monism/dualism

- Internal theories assume minds are ‘in the head’
- External theories assume minds are part of the observable world
- Dualist theories assume mind and matter are distinct substances
- Monist theories assume there is one substance (mind, matter, ?)
- Introspectionism: internal (dualist)
- Behaviourism: external (monist)
- Identity theory: internal (monist)
- Functionalism: internal (‘theoretical’ dualist)
- Lesson: monism, but how do psych. and physic. theories relate?
Reductionism/anti-reductionism

- Most reductionist:
  - eliminative materialists

- Sort of reductionist:
  - Dennett/Davidson: instrumentalist/normative

- This is in contrast to Lyons
  - Lyons clearly misreads Dennett
  - Doesn’t seem to realize explanations are for purposes
  - Or perhaps, doesn’t realize he is uncritically preferring a particular kind of purpose.
  - Makes a poor case for claim that neural reduction is ‘useless’
Science & scientism

- Lyons mistakenly equates naturalism with the view that physics is the ultimate science.
- Fodor is a perfect counter-example (naturalist, anti-unity).
- Lyons makes more false claims:
  - neuroscience hasn’t affected psychology
  - neurophysiology has had enough time to try
  - neuro. not shedding light on beliefs, etc. shows this
  - the most ‘useful’ explanations are psychological
Consciousness

- The problem that won’t go away
  - It had for a while (behaviourism)
  - Never left in continental philosophy
  - Nagel (& co.) brought it back
- Lyons is mistaken that analytic philosophers don’t consider it special (epistemologically, at least)
- Lyons’ solution is very odd
- Clearly, the problem won’t go away
Metaphysics & minds

- Lyons concludes by discussing Rorty
  - Rorty claims the mind/matter distinction should go
  - Then the mind/body problem goes two
  - Metaphysical point is generally accepted
  - Epistemological point is generally rejected
  - Why not have many descriptions? What’s the replacement?
- From the metaphysical point it follows there is no ‘essence’ to mindfulness
  - Lyons gives descriptive, normative, authoritative criteria
  - Result: the category is metaphysically subjective
- Science: determine the ‘kind of mind’ and we make it ‘real’ or not
Question