Sept. 3: Minds and Brains
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To do for next class - 1) Get the texts and read the introduction and chapters 1-4 of Metaphysics; 2) Bring a questions about something in the text (no matter how picky) to class. |
To do for next class - 1) Read chp 5 & 6; |
Introduction
Any questions about the syllabus? Any questions about what you read for today?
I presume it was obvious in the introduction that Taylor has a strong attitude towards what counts as metaphysics (or am I being to hard on him?). As far as I can tell for him metaphysics is that is done by academic philosophers who call themselves metaphysicians. However, he does hold some more standard ideas about metaphysics
He also uses a strategy which seems an attempt to scientize metaphysics. He speaks of 'data' (the given) and theories. These data will tend to be what the, as Taylor would say, 'vulgar/common, etc' person thinks - e.g. I exist, objects exist, the sun's shining, etc. Once we gather such data, we try to develop a theory which makes it all cohere (e.g. how do i know objects exist if i only get info through senses which i know to be fallible? epistemology). Despite the sciency feel here, there are some differences, like what? (observation, prediction, testability... all very important).
In his introduction to/justification of metaphysics Taylor takes a rather conservative approach. One reminiscent of Aristotle and other Greek thinkers who concluded that happiness is the goal in life and that can be achieved chiefly through contemplation. As well, metaphysics is not about knowledge (that's the second half of the course... well, not really) but as Taylor puts it wisdom, or as I'd prefer, understanding. Knowledge is constituted by facts (perhaps, more narrowly, observables). Understanding is constituted by knowing how those facts relate, tools for discovering those relations, and most importantly realizing the limitations of such tools and facts. I'm not sure there's a lot to be made from this distinction, but you get the idea.
Ontology of minds
Last time we talked about various metaphysical positions, including materialism, idealism and dualism. Do you recall what these were? There are a number more diagramed on pg. 17 of our text. Any questions about these? Quickly review.
These are all trying to provide foundations for an answer to the question of "What am I?" Why is this question important? Why is it perplexing? There seems to be a basic belief in a difference between mind and body. Philosophically, this was pointed out by Anaxagoras in 450BCE (or so). Does everyone agree that we can "hardly doubt the reality of either?". From the above we have three possible answers. 1) They are identical and physical (as the morning and evening star). 2) the are different one physical one non-physical (as the sun and Ra) Taylor notes there are different possible relationships between different things 3) They are identical and non-physical (as Hamlet and the prince of Denmark in Shakespeare's play?)
Materialism
Materialism, as discussed last day, is the default position of science. If it weren't, neuroscience wouldn't be nearly as well funded as it is today. This presumes that the 'having a body' relationship is the same as this room 'having windows, a floor, ceiling, etc. etc.' Note, however that there is a difference (which Taylor ignores). We don't normally talk of identical things as having one another it's normally used mereologically (word of the day).
Problem: Is there anything true of me that is not true of my body and vice versa? E.g. Is my body responsible? Can physical objects be the subjects of moral predicates? Are bodies intentional (i.e. have beliefs, desires, wishes)? Note: Taylor is being somewhat sophistic (pg. 13) to make his point. E.g. say brain and body every time he says body (or just brain). Also, he says "can anything be a false physical state of an object? Rather, he could say "can any physical state represent a false proposition?" But does this mean his point is wrong? Is it meaningless to assign truth/falsity to physical states (Taylor comes back to this, see p.31, but it seems to me signs can be false and they are physical objects)? What about, more compellingly I think, responsibility? (Think of computers).
Dualism (interactionism)
This problem is what leads many to distinguish minds and bodies. Minds can non-problematically be assigned truth/falsity and responsibility - by definition perhaps. (There is also an equally strong motivator from a different source: justifying personal freedom. We will talk more about this next class.) The standard distinction is a strict one. Minds are mind stuff, bodies are body stuff. We as persons are just our minds and we possess/control our bodies. Of course, the problem now arises: What is the exact relation between these two disparate things? Possession is normally a legal concept (not shared by some cultures, e.g. NA Indians) and we clearly do not 'possess' our bodies in the same way as our car. Similar problems for different relations such as 'occupancy' or 'use'. All such expressions of the relation seem to be analogies. Analogies, in particular, which don't stand the test of the examples we come up with.
Taylor has chosen to title what is often known simply as dualism (or Cartesian dualism), 'interactionism' because it seems that 'interaction' is the only reasonable relationship we can identify between minds and bodies. In particular, causal interaction (give examples: mind-> body; body -> mind). It seems we can't look in the brain and point to decisions and wishes and beliefs, and that is why these things are called mental - but we know they have physical consequences.
Problem: The claim that non-physical things cause physical things (and vice versa) is unintelligible. Taylor gives the example of perspiring from thoughts of heights. Can anyone think of one that might work? The point to such examples is that though the causal chain is complex and almost unfathomable, it is always physical cause and physical effect. If thoughts are non-physical (meaning they can't be located in space) but they seem have effects on physical things which are located in space, how is that gap bridged? How are neurons effected, or chemical reactions started by ideas? This difficulty was realized by Descartes. He solved the problem by saying that the pineal gland was the locus of these interactions. But two problems still existed: 1) Saying where something happens is not an explanation 2) The pineal gland has since been analyzed in more detail and doesn't seem particularly special, so the search for the locus continues.
Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is more recent than dualism and seems, at least in part, to attempt to provide answers to the problems raised by dualism. Epiphenomenalism is the position that psychological states exist, but that they have no causal powers, they can only be caused - hence they are epi (besides) phenomena (observable events or facts). Thus mental states never cause a physical process to occur, but they are still there!
Problems:
Note: Taylor is equivocating on 'body' in the middle of p. 27. He puts too much emphasis on 'observable' states - What about PET scans? It seems he's right, but for the wrong reasons. I.e. Mental states are superfluous, but an epiphenomenalist can still claim they occur. The reasons for this occurrence, however, aren't satisfactory.
Conclusions
It is not clear that any theory or ontology is better than any other. The one, perhaps, which seems to have the most potential is materialism. However, it is also the one which causes the most offense. It has the most potential because it has no more problems than any other theory. If we must explain how physical stuff can think/be true or false/be responsible we must also explain how non-physical stuff can... It is also promising because we seem to be making progress on such questions, though slowly, perhaps. It is offensive because it challenges us to relinquish or reconceive some of the fundamental dictums of our society (e.g. people are responsible for their actions; our sense of fairness). It is even more offensive to those whose religious beliefs are in conflict with the dictum of materialism. Materialism is thought by most to leave no room for an afterlife, a heaven, or a God.
Other questions: What does a soul add? If we have a zombie and add this thing, what is it giving to the zombie? If it only changes a zombie to a person, we've explained nothing. It needs positive effects. How does the argument from privacy go?
1) Read chp 5 & 6;