Sept 24: Causation
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To do for next class - 1) Read chps 10 and 11; 2) Come up with your own few line definition of 'A caused B' |
To do for next class - 1) Read chapter 12; 2) Give a specific example of how/where Taylor could have benefited from his own advice. Or show why some seeming example of this isn't one. |
Introduction
You may recall from our discussions of deteriminism that we had assumed everyone understood what we meant by a cause. And, in some sense it seems likely all have a good idea of what a cause is. We often use causal language, in fact almost every day. Why did a wake-up? Because my alarm went up. Why did my cereal become soggy? Because I left it sitting milk. Of course, what these things have in common is difficult to express. What is it that makes something a cause of another thing or event? Anyone want to give a try? Here we have entered onto the standard territory of philosophy, conceptual analysis. What do we mean by conceptual analysis?
Let's look more closely at the formulation of our question: what makes something a cause of another thing or event? Can anyone suggests some problems with this question? Does it makes sense to call a thing a cause? Perhaps it is the action of the thing which is the cause. Taylor refers to this as a change. His immediate identification of cause with change by saying "causes are changes" is a big step for the first page of this chapter. Does it makes sense to distinguish states and changes of substances from substances themselves? What is a substance if we take away all of its states and changes? There seems to be a strong metaphysic underlying his analysis. It's not clear that his definition of a substance as something that can be poked with a stick is going to be adequate. It's states include things like being hard, red, in motion, warm, etc. what we have left of a hard red rolling ball when we take away all of its states (the list of states would of course be larger).
So Taylor's identification of causes as states or typically changes of states (as effects are) seems to rest on his ontology. It is not clear how one could identify states, persistence is of states, changes of state, and substances.
Necessary causes
Historically there has been a question of whether the causal relationship is one of necessitation. That is, whether causes necessitate their effects or whether they are merely related by joint occurrence. What kind of necessity do you think he is talking about in this case? (Logical) what arguments for this position? Emphasis? What arguments against it? No such necessary connection is observable, science doesn't seem to assume one. What is the method for testing the necessary connection idea? (The counter example). That is, consider an analysis that has no reference to necessary connection and see if there is a counter example which fits the analysis but does not seem to be cause.
One such analysis is constant conjunction. This was an analysis first discussed in depth by Hume. In answer to the question what does it mean to say A was the cause of B the reply would be that it means only that when ever A occurs B occurs. Taylor argues that this is obviously true since any occurrence happens only once. If we don't admit of this, we must go into it into analysis of what makes two occurrences similar or not. (Note the good writing on page 92). What are some difficulties with this analysis? (Exact similarity equals identity; relaxing similarity allows things like clay matches; demanding relevant similarity presumes causal descriptions and is circular).
What if we introduced laws of nature? For example salt dissolves in water (under various specified conditions). Well, it seems that these sorts of laws support counterfactual (i.e. contrary to fact) conditionals which incorporate necessity. A counterfactual conditional is an if then statement which is subjunctive and assumes the falsity of its antecedent. It is stronger than a mere description. A description cannot be projected into the future as counterfactual conditionals suppose. If you're law were silent in the face of similar conditions, it would be no law.
Note that we are doing metaphysics. This is why Taylor dismisses the objection that only by experience causal connections are discovered and thus we do not see any necessary connections. He notes that we want to know what causes are not how they are known.
Necessary and sufficient conditions
In the case of our salt dissolving in water, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions? Recall that necessary conditions must be present for the occurrence of the change. And sufficient conditions are those conditions that if satisfied guarantee the change. Notice that necessary and sufficient in both be defined in terms of impossibility. Can you say how? Taylor arrives at the following conclusion: A was of the cause of B means: A was the set of conditions, from among all those that occurred, each of which was necessary, and totality of which was sufficient, for the occurrence of B. Any comments on this definition?
What sort of necessity is the implying in his definition? Taylor tells us that his version of necessary does not mean logically necessary. But this didn't seem to be the case before. So note that his necessity has become weaker in an important way. Notice that in this case Taylor is eager to dismiss the data he began with (p. 96).
Let's look closely at this section on p. 96 called necessity as indispensable it. How does Taylor get out of this criticism? It seems that we are left with something that can be never tested or known by definition. It's not clear that such claims can support counterfactual conditionals. Think about this section.
Causes and time
Must effects of follow their causes? Can causes and effects occur simultaneously? What about the sorts of causes Aristotle had a mind? That is teleological notions of cause. I'm not so sure about his example of a car moving down a track. In physics, effects follow causes normally. Only at the quantum level under certain interpretations are cause and effect simultaneous.
Taylor have we conclude this section by claiming to have discovered what cause is. But I believe we should perhaps have a more critical eye. What do you think?
God
Proofs of the existence of God have been around since the time of Aristotle. Of course, his was not a Christian God, but rather shared some main characteristics of that God, namely as progenitor of the universe. When examining proofs for the existence of God, it is not always clear what properties of God being established. But, in general, it is his mere existence as the designer, creator, or cause of the universe and thus us. When examining such proofs from a philosophical viewpoint, it is seldom the case that someone will be convinced to change the current belief in the existence of God. There is a story told by Wolff in which a class of undergrads were asked to raise their hands if they believed in God. He then presented them with numerous proofs for the existence of God and their refutations and asked the same question again. Of course, the response was identical. Nevertheless, many of the arguments and their refutations elucidate the tools of philosophy.
One of the first arguments for the existence of God presented by Taylor is based on a discussion from Leibniz. Leibniz identifies the principle of sufficient reason, by which he means that for any choice there must be a sufficient reason. Thus in the case of God's creation of the universe, there is a reason for his creation based on his perfect moral character and omnipotence. From this, Leibniz deduces that God must have created the best possible world. This was his solution to the problem of evil; that is, the problem of the existence of evil in a world created by a supposedly perfect being. Leibniz simply argued that it was our imperfections that did not allow us to see the sufficient reason for occurrence is in the world. Back to Taylor, he applies of this idea in attempting to convince us that if we find something unrecognizable we can not even imagine their being no reason for its existence. In fact, Taylor argues that this is true for any true statement. He also distinguishes contingent and necessary truths. But he notes that you can not assume the principle is one or the other. And I wonder if the principle applies to necessary truths. What you do think? In any case, Taylor treats it as datum, that is as something people presuppose.
So, Taylor proceeds by showing that something exists. This, of course, is what people like Descartes have denied and then shown to be true. In fact, Taylor just assumes that something exists. But, let us grant him that. Now, if something exists and the principle of sufficient reason is true then there must be a reason for that things existence. So questions like "why is there something rather than nothing?" need an answer. Taylor also digresses and talks about the fact that creation means dependence rather than making something but this is not important. So the answer to the question lies in the existence of God. God is the sufficient reason for the existence of everything excluding himself. Taylor claims that the world cannot be a necessary being because it is not eternal and indestructible (what about energy?). He seems to be badly confused on p. 105. He says the universe cannot be considered necessary since things which are necessary do not coming into being or pass away. However, things in the universe come into being or pass away not the universe itself. And, even though he notes this possibility he calls it "not plausible". Do you agree? What about the conservation of energy? Taylor thinks he has shown the world is contingent and thus need to something to depend upon. Of course, that thing is God and God must be a necessary being otherwise we would be faced with an infinite regress. Taylor feels that some people may have difficulty with the concept of necessary being an argues for it from an analogy (in a sense a reverse analogy) to the conception of impossible being. He notes a square circle is an impossible being so why not have a God which is a necessary being? What you think of this argument? This argument is closely related to that of Aristotle for the first cause. He argued that for any effect the must have been the preceding cause. If we traced that line of causes back far enough it seems we must arrive at a cause which has no cause. That cause must be God, or for Aristotle unmoved mover.
Argument from design
The you find anything strange about the sentence? "Much modern biology is predicated on his opposition that such seemingly purposeful construction is only apparent and not real... apart from the requirements of a more or less unconsciously held scientific orthodoxy, it is by no means obvious that this is so." (Who is the Orthodox?) Furthermore, evolution does not deny, as Taylor suggests, that animals are equipped "in order to pursue" certain goals. In fact, evolution provides an explanation for both why they are so equipped and one of those reasons are in its goals; namely, to exist. In any case, Taylor rightly notes that this kind of argument is of the class "argument from design". The first such argument is attributed to William Paley (Bishop). It is also called the watch maker argument. He suggested that if we found a watch lying on the beach we would assume an intelligent agent created it. Noticing that and organ like the eye is far more complicated than such a watch, by analogy we should deduce that it is the construct of an intelligent agent. Of course, arguments from analogy are not conclusive. Furthermore, in this case all we can conclude is that an agent smart enough to create an eye exists not that a omnipotent agent exists.
But Taylor wishes to take things in a different direction. He begins by a discussion of a sign which reads "the British railways welcomes you to Wales." He feels anyone would conclude that this was purposefully arranged, though you cannot prove it. But the important point is that if you believe the sign is providing you with information then you can not consistently suppose that it is an accident. It would be irrational to assume that the sign was "right" if you thought it was an accident. (Taylor's expression of this point in the middle of p. 112 seems to show a problem with his argument). We are now told that current day theories of perception are as bad as those of the ancient Greeks. In any case, he notes that eye is our wonderful things and that they seem to be "constructed in that manner in order to enable its possessor to see". Is that the case? Even if that is not the case, do we think that our organs have no purpose at all? (Is it purpose enough to satisfy certain survival constraints?)
Now, Taylor's main point is that we rely on our senses. If we rely on them to tell us something that is true mustn't we be assuming that they were created for that purpose? Just as we were assuming a sign was created to tell us that we were entering Wales. The question is then are our senses our only source of information about the world? Do we really trust our senses without any reflection on the matter? How would you go about trying to defeat this argument? What ways are there to defeat this argument?
What you think of his conclusion on p. 116? Is it true that: if X is the result of a random process, it cannot tell me the truth about something else? What does 'tell me' mean? Convey information? Be interpreted as providing knowledge?
To do for next class
1) Read chapter 12; 2) Give a specific example of how/where Taylor could have benefited from his own advice. Or show why some seeming example of this isn't one.