Winter 2017 - Topics in Game Theory
We meet Mondays, 15h00-17h00, in HH235.
- Jan. 9, Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review.
- Jan.
16, Banks and Duggan (2006), A general bargaining model of legislative
policy-making, Quarterly Journal of Political Science.
- Jan. 23, Jackson and Moselle (2002), Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game, Journal of Economic Theory.
- Jan. 30, Diermeier, Prato, Vlaicu (2015), Procedural choice in majoritarian organisations, American Journal of Political Science.
- Feb. 6, Ali, Bernheim and Fan (2014), Predictability and power in legislative bargaining, working paper.
- Feb. 13, Chen and Eraslan (2014), Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information, Theoretical Economics.
- Feb. 20, no meeting.
- Feb. 27, Austin-Smith and Banks (1988), Elections, coalitions, and legislative outcomes, American Political Science Review.
- Mar. 6, Baron and Diermeier (2001), Elections,
governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems,
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
- Mar. 13, Kalandrakis (2004), A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game, Journal of Economic Theory.
- Mar. 20, Anesi and Seidmann (2015), Bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default, Review of Economic Studies.
- Mar. 27, Dzuida and Loeper (2016), Dynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo, Journal of Political Economy.
- Apr. 3, Ortner (2016), A theory of political gridlock, Theoretical Economics.
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