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Contents

Contributors and contact details

1 Introduction
John Scott and Peter J. Carrington

Part I. General issues

2 Social Network Analysis: An Introduction
Alexandra Marin and Barry Wellman

3 The Development of Social Network Analysis—with an Emphasis on Recent Events
Linton C. Freeman

4 Network Theory
Stephen P. Borgatti and Virginie Lopez-Kidwell

5 Social Physics and Social Networks
John Scott

6 Social Networks in Economics
Sanjeev Goyal

7 Relational Sociology, Culture, and Agency
Ann Mische

Part II. Substantive topics

8 Personal Communities: The World According To Me
Vincent Chua, Julia Madej and Barry Wellman

9 Social Support
Lijun Song, Joonmo Son and Nan Lin

10 Kinship, Class, and Community
Douglas R. White

11 Animal Social Networks
Katherine Faust
Networking Online: Cybercommunities
Anatoliy Gruzd and Caroline Haythornthwaite

Corporate Elites and Intercorporate Networks
William K. Carroll and J. P. Sapinski

Political Dimensions of Corporate Connections
Matthew Bond and Nicholas Harrigan

Policy Networks
David Knoke

Social Movements and Collective Action
Mario Diani

Crime and Social Network Analysis
Peter J. Carrington

Terrorist Networks: The Threat of Connectivity
Renée C. van der Hulst

Scientific and Scholarly Networks
Howard D. White

Cultural Networks
Paul DiMaggio

Social Networks, Geography, and Neighbourhood Effects
Ron Johnston and Charles Pattie

Edward L. Kick, Laura A. McKinney, Steve McDonald, Andrew Jorgenson

Part III. Concepts and Methods

A Brief Introduction to Analyzing Social Network Data
Robert A. Hanneman and Mark Riddle

Concepts and Measures for Basic Network Analysis
Robert A. Hanneman and Mark Riddle

Survey Methods for Network Data
Peter V. Marsden
26  Survey Sampling in Networks  
    Ove Frank

27  Qualitative Approaches  
    Betina Hollstein

28  Analyzing Affiliation Networks  
    Stephen P. Borgatti and Daniel S. Halgin

29  Positions and Roles  
    Anuška Ferligoj, Patrick Doreian and Vladimir Batagelj

30  Relation Algebras and Social Networks  
    Philippa Pattison

31  Statistical Models For Ties and Actors  
    Marijtje A.J. van Duijn and Mark Huisman

32  Exponential Random Graph Models for Social Networks  
    Garry Robins

33  Network Dynamics  
    Tom A.B. Snijders

34  Models and Methods to Identify Peer Effects  
    Weihua An

35  Kinship Network Analysis  
    Klaus Hamberger, Michael Houseman and Douglas R. White

36  Large-Scale Network Analysis  
    Vladimir Batagelj

37  Network Visualization  
    Lothar Krempel

38  A Reader's Guide to SNA Software  
    Mark Huisman and Marijtje A.J. van Duijn
Applications of social network analysis in the study of crime fall mainly into three topic areas: the influence of the personal network on ego’s delinquency or crime, the influence of neighborhood networks on crime in the neighborhood, and the organization of criminal groups and activities. Of course, the literature is not so neatly organized as this scheme suggests – even the boundaries of the relevant literature are fuzzy – but the following account is organized around these categories, while acknowledging the instances of work that straddle them, or lie only partly within them.

**INFLUENCE OF PERSONAL NETWORKS ON DELINQUENCY AND CRIME**

The most common use of social network analysis in criminology has been in analyses of the effects of personal networks on adolescents’ delinquency (and, to a lesser extent, on adults’ crime). Almost all of this research is based, explicitly or implicitly, on one or both of two theories of crime and delinquency: differential association theory and social control theory.

**Differential association theory**

According to this theory of delinquency, first formulated in 1939 by Edwin Sutherland (1939; Sutherland et al., 1992), criminal attitudes and behavior are not innate, but are learned from “intimate personal groups.” According to the sixth proposition of this theory, the likelihood that a child or adolescent will be delinquent is affected by the relative strength of criminal and anticriminal “definitions” (i.e., norms) among his or her close associates:

6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law. This is the principle of differential association. It refers to both criminal and anticriminal associations and involves counteracting forces. (Sutherland et al., 1992: 89)

Later reformulations of differential association theory have resulted in the “social learning” theory (Burgess and Akers, 1966) and “peer influence” theory of delinquency (Warr, 1993, 2002): the latter claiming that “peer influence is the principal proximate cause of most criminal conduct” (Warr, 2002: 136; emphasis in the original).

Consistently strong empirical correlations between subjects’ delinquency and that of their friends or “peer group,” even in the presence of controls for other factors, has been interpreted as strong support for differential association theory (Shoemaker, 2005: 152; Warr, 2002: 76). However, the theory has been criticized on the grounds (among others) of the difficulty of measuring the relative strength of pro- and anticriminal definitions among ego’s associates (Shoemaker, 2005: 151; see also “Measuring peers’ delinquency” below).
Sutherland’s seventh proposition offered some guidance on this issue:

7. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity. (Sutherland et al., 1992: 89)

Luckenbill commented in 1992 on the measurement issue:

In a precise description of the criminal behavior of a person, these modalities would be rated in quantitative form and a mathematical ratio would be reached. A formula in this sense has not been developed, and the development of such a formula would be extremely difficult. (Sutherland et al., 1992: 89)

To anyone familiar with social network analysis, its potential usefulness in operationalizing the main concepts in differential association theory is obvious. The “intimate personal groups” in which criminal learning occurs are simply ego’s personal network (Chua et al., this volume). Measuring the “frequency, duration, priority, and intensity” of associations is a staple of personal networks research (Hanneman and Riddle, this volume). Evaluating communication processes and the diffusion of information in networks are staples of social network research on communication and information diffusion (e.g., Monge and Contractor, 2003; Myers, 2000; Shih and Chang, 2009; Valente, 1995). Differential association theory can be seen as a specific instance of the more general network theory of social learning, that ego’s attitudes and behavior are affected by the attitudes and behavior of the members of his or her personal network, and the effects are conditioned by the characteristics of the network. This would be consistent with Sutherland’s own insistence that “the processes which result in systematic criminal behavior are fundamentally the same in form as the processes which result in systematic lawful behavior” (cited in Warr, 2002: 75).

**Social control theory**

Social control theory, first formulated by Hirschi (1969), proposes that the propensity for antisocial, deviant, or criminal behavior is innate but is normally restrained by internalized and external informal social control, due to bonding to social control agents such as parents, family, peers, school, and community — that is, to the social integration of the individual. Thus, delinquency and crime are a result of weak social bonds.

Social control theory has been interpreted in network terms to imply that delinquents tend to be social isolates, rejecting and being rejected by their peers (Ekland-Olson, 1983: 275–76) and other potential agents of informal social control, and conversely that nondelinquents tend to be well connected with such agents. This is in clear contrast with differential association theory, which characterizes both delinquents and nondelinquents as being embedded in peer and family networks but with differing normative balances. The contradictory implications of the two theories of delinquency have motivated social network research researchers to attempt to assess the level of empirical support for each theory.

**Krohn’s network theory of delinquency**

Marvin Krohn’s (1986) network theory represents an early attempt to apply social network analysis explicitly to the explanation of delinquency. Krohn’s theory combines elements of social control and differential association theories of delinquency. According to this theory, the social cohesion of ego’s personal network, as indicated by its multiplexity and density, affects both ego’s social integration (as in social control theory) and the balance of influences of procriminal and anticriminal definitions in the network (as in differential association theory). At the macrostructural level, the delinquency rate of a community will be inversely related to the density and multiplexity of its social networks, which are affected by social structural characteristics of the community, such as population density, geographic mobility, and the social stratification system.

Krohn’s theory treats attachment to parents, teachers, and other adults as an aspect of social bonding, and therefore as an element of social control theory, not of differential association theory. This distinction between adults and age peers is consistent with much of the subsequent research that tests or employs differential association theory, whether informed by social network analysis or not: the “intimate personal groups” within which the balance of procriminal and anticriminal definitions are measured are often assumed to be exclusively composed of the young person’s age peers, or “friends,” so that differential association theory is treated as being equivalent to peer influence theory (Warr, 2002: 73). Relationships with parents and family are taken as evidence of social bonding. However, Sutherland’s formulation of differential association theory does not distinguish between adult agents of social
control such as parents, and the young person’s age peers (Sutherland et al., 1992: 89; Warr, 2002: 73). Differential association research that is more informed by social network analysis considers the influence of persons in any role vis-à-vis ego, using the type and strength of the tie, not generational equivalence, as the criterion of inclusion in the personal network.

Krohn’s network theory of delinquency has received limited attention. Following Friday and Hage (1976), Krohn et al. (1988) found that multiplexity or role overlap in personal networks, including parents and friends, partly explained the cigarette smoking behavior of high school students in a Midwestern city: youth who participated jointly with their parents or friends in activities, such as homework, athletics, church, and membership in other organizations, were less likely to smoke cigarettes. Haynie (2001) found that personal network density is an important conditioner of the association between ego’s and peers’ delinquency: the relationship was stronger for egos with higher-density networks. Going beyond Krohn’s theory, she found that ego’s centrality and popularity also condition the relationship, but less so than network density: the relationship is stronger for egos with higher centrality and higher popularity.

**Network composition**

Most of the research that refers to social networks in relation to differential association or social control theory is concerned only with the composition of the peer network – the number or proportion of delinquent friends and (in some cases) of family members – and ignores its structural features (e.g., Capowich et al., 2001; Depta and Cohen, 2004; Elliott and Menard, 1996; Giordano et al., 1993; Gutierrez-Lobos et al., 2001; Hanson and Scott, 1996; Laird et al., 1999; Lee, 2004; McCarthy and Hagan, 1995; Weerman and Bijleveld, 2007). In one of the more sophisticated attempts to measure the balance of criminal and anticriminal definitions in the peer network, Haynie (2002) found that it is the proportion of friends who are delinquent that is most strongly correlated with ego’s delinquency, rather than the number of delinquent friends, the average level of delinquency of friends, or the total level of friends’ delinquency. She also found that consensus (either pro- or antidelinquency) in the peer network was most strongly associated with ego’s own behavior. Bruinsma (1992) is a rare example of differential association research that includes parents as possible sources of deviant definitions in ego’s personal network. Using data on 1,096 Dutch secondary school students and stepwise path analysis, he found that frequency of contact with deviant parents and with deviant peers both have positive influences on the respondent’s formation of positive definitions of deviant behavior, which in turn increases the frequency of the respondent’s criminal behavior; however, the impact of deviant friends was much greater. Lonardo et al. (2009) found that parents’ and peers’ deviance were associated with adolescents’ deviance, but having a deviant romantic partner was especially influential.

**Measuring peers’ delinquency**

Research on delinquent peers traditionally relied on the respondent’s assessment of his or her peers’ delinquency. This approach has been criticized for vulnerability to measurement error due to limitations on the respondents’ ability to observe and remember their peers’ delinquent attitudes and behavior, and also to bias arising from projection by respondents of their own attitudes and behavior onto their peers; thus inflating the crucial correlation between the delinquency of self and of peers (see Meldrum et al., 2009, for a review of this issue). Research comparing the size of the correlations obtained from respondents’ reports and peers’ own reports of their delinquency has found that the correlation is indeed considerably larger when respondents’ reports are used. Weerman and Smeenk (2005: 518) interpret this finding to mean that the true correlation lies somewhere between the two estimates. This is an instance of the more general measurement problem in research on egocentric networks: that “proxy reports” provided by ego of alters’ characteristics and behavior are of variable accuracy, depending on the type of information solicited (see Marsden, this volume, for a discussion).

**Gender composition**

A somewhat different approach to the relationship between peer network composition and ego’s delinquency is to examine the gender composition of the peer network. The general idea is that female-dominated networks tend to provide “more social control, fewer opportunities and less motivation for offending and may therefore discourage crime,” for both males and females, but especially for females (McCarthy et al., 2004). This suggests social control theory, but the effect of female-dominated networks may also be due to differential association, as females are much less criminal than males. Lacasse et al. (2003) found that the gender composition of adolescents’ friendship networks affects the incidence of potentially offensive sexual behavior but not the subject’s tolerance of such behavior. Haynie and Piquero...
(2006) found that the relationship between the onset of puberty and violent victimization is moderated by the gender composition of boys’ personal networks: the relationship is weaker for boys with a higher proportion of girls in their network. For girls, no moderating effect of network composition was found. In a sample of adult heroin injectors in Baltimore, Curry and Latkin (2003: 482) found that “for females but not males, a higher number of females in one’s network was associated with a lower frequency of arrests.” Lichtenstein (1997) found that in a small sample of Alabama women incarcerated for drug-related crimes, their personal networks comprised mainly male intimates, and the use of crack cocaine was attributed to the influence of these male intimates. Weerman and Bijleveld (2007) found that differences in the personal networks of non-, minor, and serious delinquents in a sample of Dutch high school students were mainly due to cross-gender friendships. Delinquent students appeared to be more popular than nondelinquents in cross-gender friendships (girls nominated delinquent boys more often, boys nominated delinquent girls more often), while non-, minor, and serious delinquents were on average not more or less popular among students from their own gender.

**Types of ties**

Houtzager and Baerveldt (1999) differentiated different types of ties among Dutch high school students. They found that a respondent’s level of self-reported delinquency was not associated with the emotional closeness of peer relations, the occurrence of positive relations such as practical support, emotional support, friendship and intimate friendship, or with unpopularity. Using the same data, Baerveldt et al. (2004) analyzed 10 different types of ties and found no evidence that delinquents have poorer peer relationships, and evidence of a correlation between ego’s level of delinquency and that of both weakly and strongly tied peers – implicitly suggesting support for differential association theory but not for social control theory. Weerman and Smeenk (2005) found that both “regular friends” and “best friends” in the networks of Dutch high school students affect ego’s delinquency, with little difference in strength of effect.

Patacchini and Zenou (2008) analyzed data from the Add Health survey within the framework of Granovetter’s (1973) “strength of weak ties” theory. Granovetter proposed that the individuals to whom one is weakly tied are more likely to be sources of influence for change than those to whom one is more strongly tied. Strong ties, such as family and close friends, tend to know one another and therefore tend to form closed communication circles, in which the same information and attitudes are recycled. Furthermore, following the principle of homophily (McPherson et al., 2001; and see below, under “Gangs, groups and networks”), one’s close friends tend to hold attitudes and opinions similar to one’s own. In contrast, persons to whom one is weakly tied, such as acquaintances, school friends and colleagues, and more distant family members, are more likely to have attitudes that are less congruent with one’s own and to belong to social circles that one is not a member of. Thus, weak ties are more likely to form “bridges” between otherwise unconnected social circles and consequently to be sources of new information and attitudes. In relation to delinquency, Granovetter’s theory implies that the close friends of nondelinquents will also be nondelinquent, and it is the weak ties of nondelinquents who are more likely to be delinquent and therefore to exert a delinquent influence. Patacchini and Zenou (2008) found support for this hypothesis: the proportion of weak versus strong ties in the friendship network was found to have a positive impact on the onset of delinquency.

**Structure: centrality, cohesiveness, and bridging**

Baerveldt and Snijders (1994) found no support for hypotheses concerning the relationship between ego’s delinquency and segmentation in the network. Baron and Tindall (1993) found that the strength of a gang member’s delinquent attitudes was positively associated with his or her centrality (betweenness and geodesic closeness) in the gang, as well as to weak conventional bonds. Pearson and West’s (2003) study of the adoption of “risky behaviors” (smoking and cannabis use) by students in a Scottish high school suggests that ego’s position in the peer network (“as a group member, a group peripheral or a relative isolate”) and the cohesiveness of the network both have positive effects on ego’s influence on other members of the network. Lee (2004) used data from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse to examine the network positions of marijuana users, nonusers, and sellers. Users tended to cluster in subgroups that were both more central and more cohesive than those of nonusers; sellers tended to be at the center of user groups. However, the centrality and cohesiveness of groups of users varied significantly across survey sampling units.¹

Using a cross-sectional analysis of data from the first wave of the Add Health survey, Schreck et al. (2004) found that centrality in dense
Peer influence versus selection

The strong and consistent correlation observed between adolescents’ delinquency and that of their peers is susceptible to at least three interpretations: (1) differential association – that peers influence ego’s delinquency; (2) selection (homophily), or the “birds of a feather [flock together]” theory – that individuals prefer to associate with people who are similar to them; or (3) neither, because the correlation is spurious. Researchers have used longitudinal social network analyses to assess the relative explanatory power of the influence and selection theories. The consensus is that the two processes reinforce each other through interaction (as Thornberry [1987] proposed), but the evidence on the relative contribution of each process to the correlation is mixed.

Structural equation modeling of a three-wave cross-lagged panel model of data from the National Youth Survey led Elliott and Menard (1996) to conclude that peer influence leading to delinquency tends to precede and be stronger than selection of delinquent peers. However, another cross-lagged panel model analysis of data from the same survey found that “the effect of delinquency on peer associations is larger than that of peer associations on delinquency” (Matsueda and Anderson, 1998). Brook et al. (2003) found that marijuana use at T1 in a sample of Colombian adolescents predicted having marijuana-using friends at T2 (i.e., selection). Espelage et al. (2007) used p* modeling (Robins, this volume) to study the microstructures in a seventh-grade friendship network and their relationships with bullying behavior; they found evidence of both homophily (selection) and peer influence.

From their analyses of a two-wave survey of Dutch high school students, Snijders and Baerveldt (2003) found that similarity in delinquency affects both tie formation and tie dissolution. This provides support for the selection hypothesis, but the study did not test the influence hypothesis. Using actor-oriented social network modeling (“SIENA” – see Snijders, this volume) with data on students in 16 Dutch high schools, Baerveldt et al. (2008) found that influence was a “universal” process, found in all 16 schools; whereas selection operated in only four schools. The strength of selection depended on network differences between the schools. The authors suggested that the networks with significant selection were dominated by a small number of lifetime persistent delinquents. From a longitudinal analysis of a sample of Swedish adolescents, employing SIENA, Burk et al. (2007, 2008) concluded that both selection and peer influence play roles in the co-evolution of early adolescent friendship networks, but the role of peer influence is stronger.

Using data from the AddHealth survey, Haynie and Osgood (2005: 1109) found that “the normative influence of peers on delinquency is more limited than indicated by most previous studies, [and] normative influence is not increased by being more closely attached to friends or spending more time with them.” They also found support for the opportunity theory of Osgood et al. (1996), which derives from Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity theory: that having delinquent friends provides more opportunities for delinquent behavior, regardless of their normative influence. Using data from the same survey, McGloin (2009) found support for a version of peer influence theory modified by balance theory: an imbalance at T1 between ego’s and the best friend’s level of delinquency predicts a change in ego’s delinquency in the direction of the best friend’s level at T2. Using SIENA to analyze data on middle-school students in Oregon, Light and Dishion (2007) tested the “confluence hypothesis”: that rejection by peers leads to the formation of cliques of high-risk youth, who then reinforce one another’s deviant propensities. Thus, peer rejection leads to selection of deviant peers, who influence ego’s own delinquency. They found strong support for the first part of the hypothesized causal chain – that rejected youth form cliques – but only weak support for peer influence within these cliques.
**Diffusion in peer networks**

Kirke (1990, 1995, 2006) studied the diffusion of illicit drug use in the networks of teenagers’ strong peer ties. She concluded that drug use is diffused through strong ties from users to nonusers, who then become users and potential sources of new diffusion to additional nonusers; thus, “a cycle of drug diffusion occurs in which, under specified social conditions, the structure influences individual action and individual action influences the structure” (1990: Abstract). Korobow et al. (2007) analyzed an agent-based simulation model of tax (non-) compliance incorporating social networks and found that individuals with limited knowledge of their immediate network neighbors’ payoffs are more likely to be compliant than those who can factor knowledge of neighbor payoffs into their decisions.

**Desistance**

Personal networks have also been implicated in desistance from delinquency, crime, or drug abuse. Gainey et al. (1995) studied the personal networks of a sample of heavy cocaine users who were seeking treatment. They found that the sample had “stable and supportive conventional bonds (1995: 27) and their closest emotional ties were to nonusers. However, they were significantly more likely to have certain types of functional ties, such as lending or borrowing things or money, with users. Gainey et al. speculated that the nature of cocaine users’ social networks may partly explain the decision to seek treatment. Sommers et al. (1994) found that forming new personal networks was part of the process of “getting out of the life” of female long-term street offenders. The supportiveness of the personal network was also found by Shivy et al. (2007) to be a factor influencing successful re-entry into the workforce of ex-offenders. Zhang (1998) advocates the inclusion of data on social networks in evaluation of the effectiveness of boot-camp treatments for delinquents.

There is a sizeable literature on the role of personal networks in the success of substance abuse treatment programs. The consensus finding of these studies is that the composition of the personal network – primarily the number or proportion of deviant peers – and its emotional supportiveness, especially the quality of ties with family members, have a substantial impact on the likelihood of treatment success (e.g., Griffith et al., 1998; Knight and Simpson, 1996; Skeem et al., 2009; Sung et al., 2004; Wild et al., 2006).

**Reverse or complex causality**

Some research has examined the effect that delinquency and crime have on ego’s personal network, or the mediating role of personal networks in three-variable causal schemes. Following up earlier research results suggesting that one’s occupation may affect the quality of one’s personal network, Romans et al. (2001) found no differences in network quality between the networks of a convenience sample of female sex workers and those of two large community samples of age-matched women in New Zealand. Kandel and Davies (1991) found that illicit drug use led to strong bonds among young adult males but not among females. Moss et al. (2003) found that the children of drug-dependent fathers are more likely to have deviant peers from preadolescence through mid-adolescence, and speculated that these deviant affiliations may lead to the children’s own antisocial behavior. Van der Poel and van de Mheen (2006) found that crack use by a sample of 16- to 24-year-olds accelerated a process of marginalization that had begun before their drug abuse. With crack use, their personal networks shrank and the proportion of crack users in them increased. Schroeder et al. (2007) found that changes in the personal network, especially partner criminality, partly mediate the effect of illicit drug use on future offending. Bernburg et al. (2006) found that deviant peer affiliations mediate the impact of juvenile justice intervention on future delinquency.

**Conclusion**

The differential association and social control theories of crime and delinquency both invoke the immediate micro-level social environment of the individual to explain his or her behavior. Social network analysis has been used to operationalize, or model, this environment as a personal network. Variations in the attributes of the personal network, such as its composition, types of ties, and structural features, have been used to explain variations in ego’s delinquency or crime and to assess the competing claims of the social control and differential association theories. Much work remains to be done on measuring the relevant attributes of personal networks and on establishing causal pathways.

**NEIGHBORHOOD NETWORKS**

Social network analysis has also been applied to the explanation of crime at the level of the
neighborhood. It has long been observed that crime rates are higher in disadvantaged and heterogeneous neighborhoods. One explanation for this phenomenon proposes that crime is caused by social disorganization, or the breakdown of informal social control, in the neighborhood, which in turn is caused by socioeconomic disadvantage, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility (Shoemaker, 2005). While this explanation is usually treated as a theory in itself, it can also be seen as a neighborhood-level version of the social control theory of individual criminality. A competing explanation proposes that delinquent and criminal peer influences are stronger in disadvantaged neighborhoods; this is a differential association theory but at the neighborhood level.

**Social disorganization theory**

The precise meaning of the mediating concept of “social disorganization” was left unspecified for a long time after the theory was first proposed by Shaw et al. (1929). Sampson (1987) argued that social disorganization is a weakening of social bonds within the community, consequently a weakening of informal social control. Certain structural conditions in the neighborhood, such as concentrated disadvantage, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility, impair the community’s ability to informally regulate behavior in the neighborhood to conform to its shared values – resulting in an increased level of crime, whether committed by residents or by outsiders (Sampson, 2006a: 49–50). Thus, social disorganization theory is a form of social control theory, but at the level of the neighborhood rather than the individual. Sampson (2004a, 2004b; Sampson et al., 1997: 918) later introduced the concept of collective efficacy: “defined as social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good.” Sampson (1987: 110) and Leighton (1988: 365) suggested that this cohesion among neighbors might rest on social networks among residents of the community, and Sampson (2006b: 151–153) emphasized the role of the weak ties that are said to characterize neighborhood relations in the modern city. Sampson’s conceptualization of social disorganization as impaired collective efficacy is a “contextual” and “situational” view, not an individual-developmental one: “... whereas collective efficacy predicts the event-based rate of violence in a neighborhood, it does not necessarily predict rates of offending by neighborhood youth” (2006a: 50).

In a similar vein, Clear (2008) introduced neighborhood social networks as the intervening variable in the effect of high incarceration rates on high crime rates: high rates of incarceration of parent-aged men, concentrated in certain neighborhoods, can damage local social networks (and other prosocial neighborhood institutions), and this in turn leads to lower collective efficacy and higher community crime rates. Other researchers (e.g., Galster and Killen, 1995; Galster and Mikelsons, 1995; Kennedy et al., 1998) have also found links between neighborhood structural conditions, social networks, and crime but have relied on the concepts of social cohesion and social capital. According to Sampson (2006a: 37; see also Sampson, 2003), while social networks contribute to social cohesion, this in itself is insufficient to capture the concept of collective efficacy, which includes the additional elements of “mutual trust and shared expectations.”

**Differential social organization theory**

Other research has found that the relationship between neighborhood networks and the neighborhood crime rate is not always the straightforward negative one implied by social control or collective efficacy theory (e.g., Friedman et al., 2007; Gayne, 2004; Tripplett et al., 2003; Warner and Rountree, 1997). Pattillo (1998) showed that in a black, middle-class community in Chicago, the dense social networks attributable to home ownership and residential stability were criminogenic as well as protective. These dense networks of kin, friends, and neighbors facilitated informal social control of neighborhood youth, consistent (but inversely) with social disorganization theory, but also facilitated the integration of local criminals and their criminogenic influence. This finding suggests support also for differential association and peer influence theories but at the level of the neighborhood: some types of neighborhoods are differentially likely to foster an excess of procriminal over anticriminal definitions via their criminogenic networks of deviant adolescents and adults.

Matsueda (2006) theorized the varying composition, structure, and prosocial versus antisocial effects of neighborhood social networks in terms of Sutherland’s (1939) little-known theory of differential social organization – the “sociological counterpart to his social psychological theory of differential association” (Matsueda 2006: 3):

Society has become organized in such a way that a premium has been placed both on perpetrating crime and on refraining from crime. An individual may now be a member of a group organized for
crime and at the same time be a member of a group organized against crime. (Sutherland et al., 1992: 105–6)

In other words, differential social organization at the neighborhood level leads to differential association at the individual level.

Consistent with this theory, Browning et al. (2004) found that social networks in Chicago neighborhoods characterized by a high level of social organization and a high level of crime play a dual role: promotion of prosocial collective efficacy but also provision of social capital to offenders. James et al. (2004) analyzed data from semi-structured interviews with a random sample of 24 women in the American CASAWORKS substance abuse program and found that residence in poor neighborhoods exposed women to local law-breaking and substance-abusing networks, while at the same time limiting their access to supportive, prosocial networks. Harding (2009) compared the age composition of adolescent boys’ social networks and their criminogenic influence in neighborhoods with varying levels of disadvantage. He found that the boys in more disadvantaged neighborhoods were more likely to spend most of their time with older males and that this resulted in “cross-cohort socialization” into crime.

Conclusion

The social disorganization and differential social organization theories that explain the rates of crime and delinquency in neighborhoods can be seen as the neighborhood-level analogues of the social control and differential association theories of individual crime and delinquency. Social network analysis has been used to model neighborhood networks, and variations in the attributes of neighborhood networks have been used to explain variations in their rates of crime and delinquency.

In Sutherland’s differential social organization theory, structural aspects of the neighborhood such as disadvantage, heterogeneity, and residential mobility, are exogenous variables that affect the balance of antisocial and prosocial influences in neighborhood networks, which in turn affect neighborhood crime rates. This theory and associated research can therefore be subsumed under the influence of personal networks on individual criminality, and social network research in this tradition generally analyzes the characteristics of personal networks of potential delinquents and criminals, as outcomes of exogenous structural conditions.

But social disorganization theory, in its modern version as Sampson’s collective efficacy theory, is radically different. Collective efficacy theory and research sees neighborhood networks as networks of (prosocial) residents, which vary, according to exogenous structural conditions, in their efficacy in exerting informal social control of crime and delinquency in the neighborhood – whether due to locals or to outsiders. In this theory, the social control that reduces neighborhood crime is exerted not through the personal networks of potential delinquents or criminals but through the personal networks of prosocial residents, who are seen as putative social control agents. The implication for collective efficacy research using social network analysis is that it is not the attributes of the personal networks of potential delinquents and criminals that explain neighborhood crime but the attributes of the whole network existing among the residents of the neighborhood, particularly its cohesion and its capacity for the mobilization of collective action.

A major conceptual difficulty in collective efficacy theory, as some of the cited research suggests, is that the population of the neighborhood cannot be divided so neatly into potential delinquents and criminals, and prosocial residents who are potential social control agents; many, if not most, residents fall into both categories, as each individual experiences some balance of prosocial and antisocial definitions. Furthermore, the whole network of the neighborhood contains ties not only among the supposedly prosocial residents, but also among the supposedly antisocial residents who are potential delinquents or criminals, and finally, between members of these nonmutually exclusive groupings. As Sweetser (1942: 533) put it,

... that many boys in the most delinquent areas fail to absorb the delinquent “tradition” and remain law-abiding is thus possible if the culture of the delinquency area be conceived in terms of the spatial interpenetration of a delinquent and a law-abiding tradition, perpetuated by differential acquaintance and association among neighbors.

A methodological difficulty of research on neighborhood networks is that it is extremely difficult to collect data on the attributes of, and ties among, the population of the whole neighborhood. In practice, this research has relied on the personal networks of samples of residents. However, inference from sampled personal networks to whole networks is by no means straightforward (Frank, this volume). More research is needed that addresses these conceptual and methodological issues.
CRIMINAL NETWORKS

Social network analysis is also used to model the social organization of crime. Network models are employed in this literature to provide static and dynamic representations of criminal groups and criminal activities. This research tends to be exploratory and descriptive rather than theory-testing, although two theoretical issues underlie much of it:

1 What intra- and inter-organizational network structures emerge in response to various task-related and environmental contingencies? and
2 What are the performance-related consequences of the adoption of various intra- and inter-organizational network structures? (Here, “performance” refers mainly to indicators of organizational success, such as profitability, longevity, etc.)

These are also two of the fundamental questions in the sociology of organizations (e.g., Aldrich, 1979; Handel, 2003; Perrow, 1986) and of industrial organization studies (e.g., Pepall et al., 2008; Williamson, 1975), and social network analysis is used in the study of criminal networks in ways that parallel its applications in those disciplines (e.g., Burt, 1983, 1992, 2000; Carrington, 1981; Cross and Parker, 2004; Kilduff and Krackhardt, 2008; White, 1981, 2002).

Waring (2002: 43) has argued that the nature of criminal activity makes it best conceptualized as a network form of organization, rather than other forms, such as the hierarchy or market, and that criminal activity is therefore subsumed within a broader class of activities organized as networks, including policy coalitions, joint ventures, movie projects, friendships, and business, political, and community elites. Felson (2009) identified four levels of criminal cooperation, ranging from “primordial clusters” to “an extended patronal system.”

A key difference between network research on criminal networks and on peer influence and neighborhood networks is that, in principle, criminal networks include only people who are already involved in criminal activity, so the research questions involve not the etiology of crime, but its organization and the causes and consequences thereof. Also, in contrast to peer network studies, criminal network analyses are usually of whole networks rather than of personal or egocentric networks: that is, the networks are generally not conceptually centered on individuals, but comprise entire criminal groups, however defined. (However, these “whole networks” are often assembled from egocentric network data arising from police investigations [Renée van der Hulst, personal communication].)

Gangs, groups, and networks

Studies reviewed in this section mainly deal with applications of social network analysis to criminal groups that have fewer members than those studied under the rubric of “organized crime,” and commit more localized and relatively unsophisticated “street crime.” Many of these studies concern “youth gangs” or “delinquent groups,” which are further distinguished from organized crime not only by the age of the members but also by the presumed motives for participation: primarily instrumental in the case of organized crime, but a mix of instrumental and expressive motives in the case of youth gangs.

Analysis of sociograms and sociomatrices (Hanneman and Riddle, this volume), recording subjects’ friends or companions (and co-offenders), has a long history in the study of criminal organization: indeed, it was Moreno’s invention of this technique to study the social structure of incarcerated offenders at Sing Sing prison (1932) and the Hudson School for Girls (1934) that is identified by many historians as the birth of social network analysis (e.g., Freeman, 2004: 7). However, Moreno’s invention of sociometry is predated by Shaw and McKay’s (1931: 200–221) use of a two-mode incidence matrix (Borgatti and Halgin, this volume) to study co-offending cliques. Spaulding (1948) reviewed the early development of the use of the concepts and methods of social network analysis to study “cliques, gangs, and networks.”

Do gangs exist?

Social network analysis has been used to address a central question in the literature on delinquent and criminal groups and gangs: Do they really exist? Or are so-called gangs really just spontaneous, temporary, and opportunistic loosely knit, shifting alliances of unorganized individuals? There is a striking parallel to the question (see below) of the degree of “organization” of so-called organized crime groups. Network analyses of putative gang members have generally found that they – like so-called organized crime groups – exhibit local clustering within larger loosely knit networks, that is, small groups with two to a dozen or so members, with varying degrees of connection to other such groups (Daly, 2005; Fleisher, 2002; Hood and Sparks, 1970; Klein and Crawford, 1967; McGloin, 2005; Reiss, 1988; Sarnecki, 1990, 2001, 2009; Short and Strodtbeck, 1965; Spergel, 1990: 203–4;
Warr, 1996, 2002: 39; Whyte, 1943). These findings motivate the use of local clustering (clique) analysis to identify delinquent groups within larger networks (e.g., Cadwallader and Cairns, 2002; Clarke-McLean, 1996; Sarnecki, 2001).

A different way of asking whether criminal groups are really groups is to analyze the temporal stability of their composition, that is, their membership. Warr, for example, writes of “. . . the extreme instability of [the membership of] most delinquent groups . . . all groups are . . . so short-lived that it may make little sense to even speak of delinquent groups at all . . .” (1996: 33; emphasis in the original). Other research on delinquent groups has reached similar, though not always so extreme, conclusions (Sarnecki, 1990, 2001; van Mastrigt, 2008; Warr, 1996). On the other hand, Clarke-McLean (1996) found “reasonably stable” networks among a sample of 92 incarcerated youth – perhaps because they were incarcerated.

**Homophily**

Network research on delinquent groups has generally found evidence of homophily (McPherson et al., 2001) in relation to age, place of residence, and criminal experience (Clarke-McLean, 1996; Daly, 2005; Sarnecki, 2001). There is strong gender homophily (Clarke-McLean, 1996), but it is weaker for female offenders (Daly, 2005; Fleisher, 2002; Sarnecki, 2001, 2004; Warr, 1996). Carrington (2002) used a probabilistic model and Canadian co-offending data to show that the lower level of homophily among female offenders is explained by the offender sex ratio, and it does not imply any preference (see also van Mastrigt, 2008). Other research on mixed-sex delinquent groups has found evidence of recruitment of girls by older males and of male influence over, and exploitation of, females (Fleisher and Krienert, 2008). Other research on mixed-sex delinquent groups has found evidence of recruitment of girls by older males and of male influence over, and exploitation of, females (Fleisher and Krienert, 2008; but cf. Pettersson, 2005), as well as gendered criminal roles in the group (Mullins and Wright, 2003; Waring, 1993). There is racial or ethnic homophily in delinquent groups in the United States (Clarke-McLean, 1996; Daly, 2005) and, in a more complex way, in Sweden (Pettersson, 2003; Sarnecki, 2001).

**Structure**

Waring (1993) used data from presentence reports for white-collar criminals sentenced in U.S. federal courts during the 1980s to study the structures of white-collar co-offending networks. She constructed 377 co-offending networks involving 747 sample members, focusing on networks that had either of two configurations: the complete (sub-)network, or clique, in which all members are directly connected to one another; and the star (sub-)network, in which a central member is connected to all other members, none of whom is connected to one another. Within these two structural types, she also distinguished networks by their size and role differentiation. She used qualitative analysis to explore why networks take on these forms and to look at the consequences of these structures for the activities of network members. In a simulation study, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004) found that Nash equilibria are determined by the structure of links in the criminal network.

Morselli and Tremblay (2004) showed that nonredundancy in ego’s criminal contacts affects his or her criminal success, measuring nonredundancy by the “effective size” of the egocentric criminal network (Burt, 1992). McGloin and Piquero (2010) showed that redundancy, measured by the density of ties in the egocentric criminal network, is positively associated with crime type specialization in ego’s co-offenses.

Individual centrality – and its inverse, peripherality – has been used as an indicator of the extent of ego’s embeddedness in a criminal group (Sarnecki, 2001, 2004). Central members tend to be the most criminally experienced and active (Sarnecki, 1990, 2001), to have the most criminal attitudes (Baron and Tindall, 1993), and to be at most risk of violent victimization (Schreck et al., 2004). Females tend to be less central than males (Sarnecki, 2004). Using data from the AddHealth Survey and Nash equilibrium analysis, Calvó-Armengol et al. found that an adolescent’s Bonacich centrality in a network of delinquents “is a key determinant of her level of [delinquent] activity” (2005: 1).

McGloin (2005: 625–26) suggested that gang suppression efforts concentrate on members who are “cut-points” – that is, individuals who constitute the only connections between two individuals or groups and are therefore ideally placed as “contagion agents” for a “deterrence message.” However, the effectiveness of such “key player” interdiction strategies (Borgatti, 2006) is called into question by empirical research discussed below (Milward and Raab, 2006; Morselli and Petit, 2007), suggesting the adaptability of criminal networks in the face of threats, and by simulations that treat network structure as endogenous (Easton and Karaivanov, 2009).

**Intergang networks**

Papachristos (2009) studied the “social structure of gang homicide” by analyzing the social network formed by gang-related homicides in Chicago in 1994. The 66 gangs whose members were involved in the homicides as perpetrators or
victims were defined as the nodes of the network, and the homicides themselves defined the directed ties from the gang of the perpetrator to the gang of the victim. Longitudinal analyses supported the hypothesis of contagion (diffusion) of homicidal behavior. Structural analyses confirmed that homicides were influenced by, and in turn affected, the nature of members’ gang affiliations and the dominance structure of intergang relations.

**Organized crime**

The distinction between organized crime and criminal gangs and groups is not clear-cut, but it points to differences in scale, reach, type of criminal activity, and motivation. The following analysis of network analyses of organized crime is necessarily selective; additional references are available in two recent literature reviews (Morselli, 2009b; von Lampe, 2009).

Early research in the United States on the organization of the Mafia used a formal organization or hierarchical model, epitomized by the reports in the 1950s and 1960s of the Kefauver and McClellan Committees of the U.S. Senate (Albanese, 2007: 105–6; Cressey, 1969). However, lack of fit with data on many criminal organizations and activities led to dissatisfaction with this model as being overly structured. On the other hand, the economic enterprise model (Reuter, 1983), which conceptualizes criminal businesses and markets as operating according to the same principles of economic rationality as legal business enterprises, has also been criticized for its inadequacy (Liddick, 1999) – as it has in the analysis of legal business activity (Powell, 1990; White, 1981, 2002; Williamson, 1975).

Some early research (e.g., Albini, 1971; Ianni, 1974; Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972; Lupsha, 1983) suggested a network model, in which no particular structure is assumed *a priori*, but rather the social organization of the group is derived "bottom-up" (von Lampe, 2009: 94) from the observed configurations and qualities of connections and transactions among the actors, and the attributes of the actors. While network analysis makes no prior assumptions about structure, a preference for the “network model” of organized crime implies rejection of both the formal organization model and the economic model: the former having too much structure, the latter too little (Waring, 2002: 33). Thus, in the network model, criminal groups and activities are seen as “a system of loosely structured [profit-oriented] relationships” (Albini, 1971, cited in Albanese, 2007: 110). However, adoption of network analysis methods does not necessarily imply adoption of the network model: for example, Natarajan (2000) used network analysis to study the organization of a cocaine trafficking group and found that it did fit the classic “corporate” type of organization.

On the other hand, in a study of wiretapped conversations among 294 members of a heroin-dealing network in New York City, combining network concepts and measures, such as cohesiveness (density), subgroups (cliques), and individuals’ power (centrality), with several other forms of analysis, Natarajan (2006) concluded that this population did not form a unitary organization or “conspiracy” but was a “loosely structured network . . ., with little or no hierarchy” (189). However, while this network had little “formal organization,” it did not lack what might be called “network organization”: there were elements of local clustering and stratification of centrality. Similar conclusions are reached by several other recent studies of smuggling and trafficking, such as Kenney’s (2007) analysis of the Colombian drug trade, Heber’s (2009a) analysis of drug traffickers in Stockholm, Desroches’s (2005) study of drug trafficking in Canada, Xia’s (2008) review of organizational structures in Chinese organized crime, and several studies of human smuggling and trafficking (Kleemans, 2009; Lehti and Aromaa, 2006; Soudijn and Kleemans, 2009; Surtees, 2008; Zhang, 2008; Zhang and Gaylord, 1996).

**Social capital**

Two recurrent themes in the literature on organized crime are the related problems of trust and of access to resources. Criminal enterprise requires the cooperation and coordination of multiple actors, sometimes very distant from one another geographically, but criminal actors lack recourse to conventional legal procedures for enforcement of agreements. Thus, the issue of trust is especially salient in criminal enterprise, and social relations support trust, whether they are preexisting (e.g., family, ethnicity, friendship) or have developed in the course of criminal collaboration (Bruinsma and Bernasco, 2004; Felson, 2009; Granovetter, 1985: 492; Kleemans, 2007; Kleemans and de Poot, 2008; Kleemans and van de Bunt, 1999; Morselli, 2003, 2005; Tremblay, 1993; von Lampe and Johansen, 2004; von Lampe, 2009; Waring, 2002: 38–39; but cf. van de Bunt, 2008). Another theme is the need for connections – with suppliers, customers, and sources of funding and expertise (Morselli, 2005). Kleemans and his colleagues define the “social opportunity structure” as “social ties providing access to profitable criminal opportunities” (Kleemans and de Poot, 2008: 75) and emphasize that access to such opportunities is limited and
distributed unequally over the population and over the life course (van Koppen et al., 2010). Their “social opportunity structure” is very similar to the concept of social capital. For example, Lin (2001: 19) defines social capital as “investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace,” or alternatively, “a social asset by virtue of actors’ connections and access to resources in the network or group of which they are members.” Thus, Bouchard and Nguyen (2010) contrasted the payoff from the social capital of a sample of young cannabis cultivators, defined as “who you know – connections” or “resources in social networks,” with the payoff from criminal capital, defined as “what you know – talent” or “[criminal] education, training, experience” (the equivalent of human capital in the noncriminalological literature). McCarthy and Hagan (1995; Hagan, 1997; Hagan and McCarthy, 1998) linked the notions of “who” and “what” one knows by defining criminal capital as the criminal knowledge and skill that are derived from embeddedness in criminal networks.

**Structure**

Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004) found differences in cohesiveness (density), multiplexity, and clustering in the structures of networks operating in the Netherlands and involved in international trafficking in heroin, women, and stolen cars. Networks of heroin trafficking – a high-risk activity – were characterized by dense, multiplex ties in a single cluster. Ties among those involved in the trafficking of women and stolen cars were less dense, tended to be uniplex and instrumental, and each network had two or more clusters, connected in a chain by intermediate individuals or clusters. They concluded that these differences “appear to be related to the legal and financial risks . . . and . . . the [consequent] required level of trust” (2004: 79). Canter (2004) used partial-order scalegram analysis to compare the organization of 29 British drug-dealing, property-crime, or hooligan networks, along six dimensions of network structure. He identified three types of groups – ad hoc, oligarchies, and organized criminals – that differed on two dominant axes related to group size and leadership centrality. There was only a weak relationship between the tripartite typologies of criminal activities and of organizational structures. Heber (2009b) identified two central roles in the Swedish black market in construction labor: “fixers” and “network entrepreneurs”, and described the characteristics of the networks of each. McNally and Alston (2006) used intelligence data on the associations and communications of members of three Canadian outlaw motorcycle gangs to assess structural “weaknesses and vulnerabilities” in these groups by identifying core, peripheral, and cut-point members, and estimating overall gang cohesion and communication flow paths, based on measures of density, centrality, clustering, and bridging.

Morselli (2003, 2005) used the concept of structural holes (Burt, 1992; Hanneman and Riddle, this volume) to analyze the careers of two organized criminals, in an instance of criminal network analysis that uses personal networks rather than whole networks. In a combined crime-script and network analysis, Morselli and Roy (2008) used two measures of brokerage (Burt, 2005) – betweenness centrality (Hanneman and Riddle, this volume), and brokerage leverage (Gould and Fernandez, 1989) – to analyze two Canadian “ringing networks” involved in the sale of stolen vehicles. Morselli (2009a) used degree centrality and betweenness centrality (brokerage) to study the organization of the criminal activities of the Hells Angels motorcycle club in the province of Quebec – in particular to test the hypothesis that they exhibited the tightly structured hierarchical organization of the traditional organized crime paradigm. The results indicated that the organization of criminal activities was more complex and nuanced.

**Implications for interdiction**

Extending the work of Calvó-Armengol and colleagues (above), Easton and Karaivanov (2009) identified “optimal criminal networks” by finding Nash equilibria for simulated networks whose size and structure were allowed to vary (i.e., were endogenous) according to individuals’ decisions concerning their level of criminal activity and their links to others in the network, taking into account crime-reduction efforts of the authorities. They concluded that models that assume fixed (i.e., exogenous) criminal network size and structure can produce misleading results; for example, the policy of “taking out” the key player (Borgatti, 2006) may not reduce crime, because criminals may reconfigure their network in response. Milward and Raab (2006: 333) concluded from their review of research on the responses of Al Qaeda and of Colombian cocaine traffickers to efforts by control agents to suppress them that the resilience of “dark networks” lies in their ability to “rebalance differentiation and integration mechanisms in their internal structure.” Morselli and Petit (2007) reached a similar conclusion from their analysis of the reaction of a drug importation network in Montreal, Canada, to law enforcement targeting.
Methodological and programmatic work

A substantial part of the literature on criminal networks, or more generally “dark networks,” consists of methodological and programmatic papers that advocate the adoption of the “network model” or the use of social network analysis to study organized crime or that explain how to do network analysis, sometimes with illustrative case studies. Classic examples are Davis (1981), Ianni and Reuss-Ianni (1990), and Sparrow (1991a, 1991b). More recent examples include McIlwain (1999), Coles (2001), Chattoe and Hamill (2005), McAndrew (2000), Robins (2009), and van der Hulst (2009). Many recent programmatic contributions present new analytic methods or software for criminal network analysis (e.g., Borgatti, 2006; Carley et al., 2002; Chen, 2002; Hadjijid et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2009; Huang, 2005; Kaza et al., 2009; Marshall et al., 2008; Oatley, 2006; Oatley et al., 2005; Oatley et al., 2008; Rhodes and Keefe, 2007; Schwartz and Rouselle, 2009; Smith and King, 2002; Stovin and Davies, 2008; Tsvetovat and Carley, 2007; Tutzauer, 2007; Xu and Chen, 2003, 2005a, 2005b; Xu et al., 2004).

Conclusion

Much of the social network research on criminal networks is exploratory and descriptive, and it seeks to give a (literally) graphic account of the structure of the networks being studied. Some research goes beyond description and explores the causes or consequences of compositional and morphological variations in criminal networks. Researchers on organized crime networks, whose members are presumed to be predominantly rational-instrumental in their behavior, have explored both task-related and environmental determinants of network attributes and also the outcomes of these attributes in terms of organizational success. Research on criminal networks has also investigated the implications of network attributes for interdiction strategies.

As van der Hulst (this volume) has pointed out in relation to network analyses of terrorism, researchers on criminal networks tend, with a few exceptions, to fall into two distinct classes, each operating under severe constraints. Academic researchers have expertise in criminological theory and research but tend to lack “domain expertise” and access to good data. Operational (crime) analysts have domain expertise and access to classified data but tend to lack the motive or training to do research on criminological issues – or may be prevented by secrecy considerations from publishing their research. More generally, accurate and comprehensive data on “dark networks” are, as the term implies, inherently difficult to obtain. The empirical research cited in this section is a testament to the ingenuity and assiduousness of the authors. Perhaps the gradual diffusion of knowledge of the value of social network analysis in the study of criminal groups will result in better access for criminologists to classified data.

DISCUSSION

The use of social network analysis in criminology is in its infancy. The great majority of so-called network studies of crime and delinquency consider only the composition, or characteristics, of the members or of the networks, and not of the structure of their relationships. Most analyses of network structures are impressionistic, relying on visual examination of sociograms, rather than being computational. Even the computational analyses tend to limit themselves to the simplest network concepts and indices, such as density and centrality. Few criminologists appreciate the usefulness of social network analysis in modeling criminological concepts and propositions, or are trained in network methods, or use network analysis software. Suitable data are difficult to obtain or to generate.

Nevertheless, a small number of criminologists are knowledgeable in the concepts and methods of social network analysis, and some have shown great ingenuity in finding or generating suitable data. They have produced a number of sophisticated and powerful criminological network analyses over the past decade. Much more needs to be done, particularly in training in social network analysis and access to data. The recent publication of the first pedagogical article on social network analysis to appear in a criminological journal (McGloin and Kirk, 2010) may be a harbinger of future developments.

NOTES

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REFERENCES


CRIME AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS


