Accountability in Markovian Elections (with John Duggan), Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
Bureaucrats and Policies in Equilibrium Administrations (with Gergely Ujhelyi and Michael Ting), Journal of the European Economic Association, 21-3, June 2023.
Don't Hatch the Messenger? On the Desirability of Restricting the Political Activities of Bureaucrats (with Gergely Ujhelyi), Journal of Theoretical Politics, 33(1), 95-139, 2021.
Representative Voting Games (with John Duggan), Social Choice and Welfare, 56, 443-66, 2021.
Production Priorities in Dynamic Relationships (with Jan Zapal), Theoretical Economics, 15(3), 861-889, July 2020. Supersedes the working paper "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships".
Civil Service and the Growth of Government, Journal of Public Economics, 177, September 2019, 104045.
Fixed Point Approaches to the Proof of the Shapley-Bondareva Theorem (with Metin Uyanik), Economic Theory Bulletin, 7(1), 117-24, May 2019.
A Dynamic Duverger's Law (with Vikram Maheshri), Public Choice, 165(3-4), 285-306, December 2015, along with the Supplementary Appendix.
Useless Prevention vs. Costly Remediation, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 10(2), 187-220, 2015.
Keeping Your Options Open, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 53, 47-68, April 2015.
Two-Party Competition with Persistent Policies, Journal of Economic Theory, 153, 64-91, July 2014, along with the Supplementary Appendix.
Competing Through Information Provision, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31(5), 438-51, September 2013.
Working Papers
Elections with Job-Motivated Bureaucrats
A Note on Farsighted Decision Making in Stationary Dynamic Programming Problems (with John Duggan)
Existence of Markov Electoral Equilibria (with John Duggan).
(De)Regulation and Market Thickness (with Vikram Maheshri).